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Abstract— Network controllability robustness reflects
how well a networked dynamical system can maintain its
controllability against destructive attacks. This paper in-
vestigates the network controllability robustness from the
perspective of a malicious attack. A framework of hierarchi-
cal attack is proposed, by means of edge- or node-removal
attacks. Edges (or nodes) in a target network are classified
hierarchically into categories, with different priorities to
attack. The category of critical edges (or nodes) has the
highest priority to be selected for attack. Extensive experi-
ments on nine synthetic networks and nine real-world net-
works show the effectiveness of the proposed hierarchical
attack strategies for destructing the network controllability.
From the protection point of view, this study suggests that
the critical edges and nodes should be hidden from the
attackers. This finding helps better understand the network
controllability and better design robust networks.
Index Terms— attack strategy, complex network, critical
edge, network controllability, robustness
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY real-world systems can be modeled as complexnetworks, which have gained growing recognition and
popularity since the late 1990s, now becoming a self-contained
discipline encompassing computer science, systems engineer-
ing, statistical physics, applied mathematics, and social sci-
ences [1]–[4]. In practical applications, it is essential to deter-
mine whether or not a networked system can be controlled for
utilization. Consequently, network controllability has become
a focal research topic in network studies [5]–[15]. Same as
the classical concept for systems, controllability here refers to
the ability of a dynamical network being steered by external
inputs from any initial state to any desired target state under
an admissible control input within a finite duration of time.
On the other hand, random failures and malicious attacks on
complex networks have become more and more frequent and
severe recently [16]–[21]. Such failures and attacks take place
in the form of node- and edge-removals, causing significant
consequences to the systems such as malfunctioning or even
completely crashing. For example, failures of traffic lights may
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cause traffic congestion in the urban transportation networks;
neurological disorders may cause dysfunction or illness to
humans. To resist attacks or failures, strong robustness is
desirable and often necessary for a practical networked system.
In different scenarios, there are different definitions and mea-
sures for network robustness [22]. Since theoretical analysis
seems impossible for large-scale complex networks, at least in
the present time, the correlation between network robustness
and topological features are generally investigated empirically,
taking advantages of super-computing power available today
[22]–[24]. In this pursuit, it is worth mentioning that the
development of deep learning techniques offers an efficient
option for empirical studies [25]–[27].
The notion of random failures and malicious attacks on
complex networks, as well as the corresponding network
robustness, covers a broad range of subjects. This paper
concerns with the network controllability robustness, which
refers to how well a networked dynamical system can maintain
its controllability against random failures or, in particular,
intentional attacks.
The issue of network robustness within different contexts
regarding network topologies has been extensively investi-
gated, and many edge- and node-removal attack strategies have
been proposed to destruct the connectedness of the networks.
Generally, attack strategies can be categorized into random
and targeted attacks. A targeted attack aims at removing an
intentionally selected object (e.g., the highest-degree node
or largest-betweenness edge), while a random attack do the
removal randomly.
In the above studies, it is commonly assumed that necessary
knowledge of the network is known and is updated after each
attack. For targeted attacks, it is also assumed that the targeted
object is more important than the others in maintaining the
network connectedness. Commonly used measures of impor-
tance include degree centrality, betweenness centrality, neigh-
borhood similarity [28], branch weighting [29], and structural
holes [30]. However, ranking the importance of nodes or
edges is practically intractable for large-scale networks, since
most measures cannot guarantee that removing the targeted
object will definitely cause a greatest effect of damage on the
network.
The size of the largest connected component (LCC) is
widely used as a measure for connectedness robustness [18].
It is observed that betweenness-based attacks may become
less effective in the later stage of an attack process. This
observation consequently leads to the effective conditional
attack strategy: to remove the global highest-betweenness node
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only if it belongs to LCC; otherwise, to remove the local
highest-betweenness node inside the LCC [31]. In [32], degree
and betweenness are used simultaneously, with predefined
weights for their balance, as the measure of importance. The
module-based attack strategy [33], [34] aims at attacking
the nodes with inter-community edges, which are crucial to
maintain the connectedness among communities. The damage-
based attack [35] uses the degree of damage to measure the
effectiveness of an attack, where the damage of an attack is
defined by the change of the LCC size before and after the
attack. It is also observed that the evolution process of attack
and defense can enhance the network robustness [36], which
is similar to the process of a mutual improvement of spears
and shields.
Although the robustness of connectedness has a certain
positive correlation with the robustness of controllability on
a network, they actually have very different measures and
objectives, as illustrated by the simple example shown in Fig.
1, where the driver node is a node to be controlled by an
input so as to make the whole network become (or return
to be) controllable (after the attack). This paper is concerned
with the interplay of the connectedness, attack strategies, and
controllability robustness of general complex networks.
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Fig. 1: [color online] Example of controllability and connect-
edness robustness: (a) given a star-shaped network, the number
of required driver nodes is 4; its LCC is 6; (b) after the central
hub is removed, the number of required driver nodes becomes
5; its LCC drastically dropped to 1.
Specifically, this paper focuses on the attack strategies that
aim at destructing the network controllability. It is observed
that removing highest-degree nodes [37] or highly-loaded
edges [38] are more effective to degrade the network controlla-
bility than random removals. Furthermore, in [39] it is shown
that node-removals are more harmful than edge-removals to
the network controllability, and that heterogeneous networks
are more vulnerable than homogeneous networks. Also, it is
found that for many real-world networks the betweenness-
based attacks are the most destructive to the controllability
[39]. Moreover, it is reported in [40] that degree-based node-
removal attacks cause greater damage to local-world networks
[41] with a larger local-world size, while networks with
smaller local-world sizes are more robust regarding both
connectedness and controllability. Notably, the hierarchical
structure of a directed network enables the random upstream
(or downstream) attack, which removes the upstream (or
downstream) node of a randomly-picked one, resulting in
a more destructive attack strategy than the simple random
attacks [19]. For a directed network, edges can be categorized
into three types [5]: 1) critical edges, whose removal destroys
the network controllability; 2) redundant edges, whose re-
moval has no influence on the controllability; and 3) ordinary
edges, whose removal will not change the number of needed
driver nodes, but may change the set of driver nodes. The
critical edge attack strategy [42] collects all the critical edges
from the initial network and remove them, thereafter a random
edge attack is performed. This is more destructive than a
simple degree- or betweenness-based attack in the early stage
of the process.
In this paper, a hierarchical framework is proposed for both
node- and edge-removal attacks, aiming at maximizing the
destruction of the network controllability. The main contri-
butions of this work are: 1) the concept of critical node
is introduced, quantified and analyzed, as a complement to
the concept of critical edge; 2) a new hierarchical attack
framework is proposed, which sorts the destruction of nodes
or edges in a descending order, and is updated iteratively; 3)
extensive simulations are performed to verify the effectiveness
of the proposed methods, revealing that the exposure of critical
edges and nodes is harmful to maintain a good network
controllability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the network controllability and its robustness, and
several existing attack strategies. Section III introduces a new
hierarchical attack framework. Section IV evaluates both the
hierarchical node- and edge-removal strategies by extensive
numerical simulations, on both synthetic and real-world net-
works. Section V concludes the investigation.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Controllability and Controllability Robustness
A linear time-invariant (LTI) networked system, described
by x˙ = Ax + Bu, is state controllable if and only if the
controllability matrix [B AB A2B · · ·AN−1B] has a full
row-rank, where A and B are constant matrices of compatible
dimensions, x is the state vector, u is the control input, and N
is the dimension of A. The structural controllability is its slight
generalization dealing with two parameterized matrices A and
B, in which the parameters characterize the structure of the
underlying networked system: if there are specific parameter
values that can ensure the system to be state controllable, then
the system is structurally controllable. If the system is state
controllable, its state vector x can be driven from any initial
state to any target state in the state space within finite time
by a suitable control input u. Clearly, without control input
u, or B ≡ 0, the networked system is by no means con-
trollable. Likewise, for a network of one-dimensional (scalar)
nodes, there exist control inputs to some nodes to ensure its
controllability. This network controllability is characterized by
the minimum number of nodes with control inputs, called
driver nodes, needed to maintain the controllability. When the
network is put into the above LTI system formulation, how
many and which nodes should be driver nodes are described
by the matrix B.
Specifically, the controllability of a network of N scalar
nodes is measured by the density of the driver nodes nD,
LOU et al.: A FRAMEWORK OF HIERARCHICAL ATTACKS TO NETWORK CONTROLLABILITY 3
defined by
nD ≡ ND
N
, (1)
where ND is the minimum number of driver nodes needed to
retain the network controllability. Smaller nD value represents
better controllability. Practically, ND can be calculated in
two ways, for structural controllability and for exact (state)
controllability, respectively. It was shown in [5] that iden-
tifying the minimum number of driver nodes to achieve a
full control of a directed network requires searching for a
maximum matching of the network, which quantifies the
network structural controllability. When a maximum matching
is found, ND is determined by the number of unmatched
nodes, i.e., nodes without control inputs, given by
ND = max{1, N − |E∗|}, (2)
where |E∗| is the number of nodes in the maximum matching
E∗. As for exact controllability [6], ND is calculated by
ND = max{1, N − rank(A)}. (3)
The controllability robustness is evaluated after some nodes
or edges are removed, one by one, yielding a sequence of
values (represented by a controllability curve) that reflect
how robust (or vulnerable) a networked system is against a
destructive attack. The controllability curve under a node-
removal attack is calculated by
nND(i) ≡
ND(i)
N − i , i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (4)
where ND(i) is the number of driver nodes needed to retain
the network controllability after i nodes have been removed,
and N represents the number of nodes in the original network.
Note that, given an N -node network, one can remove at most
N − 1 nodes, excluding the trivial empty case. Similarly,
the controllability curve under an edge-removal attack is
calculated by
nED(i) ≡
ND(i)
N
, i = 0, 1, . . . ,M, (5)
where ND(i) is the number of driver nodes needed to retain
the network controllability after i edges have been removed,
and N and M represent the numbers of nodes and edges in
the original network. Here, nND(0) = n
E
D(0) represents the
controllability of the original network, of which no node or
edge has been removed.
To measure the overall controllability robustness of a net-
work, the controllability curves are averaged:
RNc =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
nND(i), (6)
and
REc =
1
M + 1
M∑
i=0
nED(i). (7)
Lower RNc and R
E
c values mean better overall controllability
against node- and edge-removal attacks, respectively.
B. Existing Attack Strategies
The most frequently used measures of importance are the
degree and betweenness centralities. A weighted measure is
given by
pi = α× ki∑N
i=1 ki
+ β × bi∑N
i=1 bi
, (8)
where ki and bi represent the degree and the betweenness
of node i, pi represents the probability of removing it, and
α and β are weights, which are set manually in [32] with
β being replaced by 1 − α in [43]. Similarly, in [44] three
parameters, α, β and γ, are used to control the weights
of degree, betweenness and harmonic closeness, respectively.
These measures have been used in the strategies to attack
interdependent networks [43]–[47], networks of networks [48],
[49], and weighted networks [50].
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Fig. 2: [color online] An example of critical edges and nodes
changing during the attack process: (a) edge (2, 4) is non-
critical in the initial network, but becomes critical after some
edge-removals; (b) nodes 2,3 and 4 are critical initially, but
node 1 is removed, all of them become non-critical, and after
node 4 is removed, node 2 becomes critical again.
The edge-removal attack strategy proposed in [42] aims at
removing the critical edges of the initial network, and after all
the initial critical (IC) edges have been removed a random
attack is performed. This IC attack strategy is specifically
designed to degrade the network controllability, where the term
‘critical’ is defined for controllability. This attack is especially
destructive in the early stage of the process, but becomes less
effective in latter stages, because critical edges are changing
during the process due to the removal of some other edges.
An example is shown in Fig. 2 (a), where a non-critical
edge (edge (2, 4)) becomes critical after some edge-removals.
Therefore, critical edges need to be updated throughout the
attack process such that the damage to network controllability
can be maximized.
C. Critical Edges and Nodes
In this paper, the concept of critical edge defined in [5]
is adopted. An edge is critical if and only if its removal
increases the number of driver nodes needed to retain the
network controllability; otherwise, it is non-critical. Inspired
by this, the concept of critical node is introduced here. A
node is critical if and only if its removal increases the number
4 GENERIC COLORIZED JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2020
of driver nodes needed to retain the network controllability;
otherwise, it is non-critical. An example of critical node is
shown in Fig. 2 (b), where the blue-colored nodes are critical
nodes.
The critical nodes and edges are the most important ele-
ments in the concern of network controllability, in the sense
that their removal will cause the maximum possible destruction
to the network controllability. Therefore, in an efficient attack
strategy, critical nodes and edges should be removed with the
highest priority. It should be noted that, through the attack
process, both critical nodes and edges will be dynamically
changed, as illustrated by the example shown in Fig. 2.
Therefore, in analyzing the attack strategy and its effect, the
list of critical nodes and edges must be updated iteratively,
step by step, after each attack.
III. HIERARCHICAL ATTACK FRAMEWORK
A. Hierarchical Edge Attack
The proposed framework classifies all edges hierarchically
into three types: 1) critical edges, as defined above; 2) sub-
critical edges, whose removal does not increase the number of
needed driver nodes, but increases the number of unmatched
nodes; and 3) normal edges, which are the rest edges. The
subcritical and normal edges are non-critical edges. In a
hierarchical attack, the priorities of attacking these three types
are in descending order, namely, selecting the critical edges
with the highest priority to attack, followed by the subcritical
ones, and finally the normal ones. An example of these three
types of edges is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: [color online] Example of edge hierarchy: (a) edge
(2, 3) is critical, whose removal will increase the number of
needed driver nodes by 1; (b) edge (4, 6) is subcritical, whose
removal will not change the number of driver nodes but will
increase the number of unmatched nodes by 1; (c) edge (7, 8)
is normal, whose removal does not change the numbers of
driver nodes and unmatched nodes.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for hierarchical edge
selection. Given a network with M edges, represented by its
adjacency matrix A, Algorithm 1 returns the index of the edge
to be removed with the highest priority. Lines 1–3 initialize
three empty lists for the three types of edges. Lines 4 and 5
calculate the numbers of needed driver nodes and unmatched
nodes of the original network before being attacked. The for-
loop between Lines 6–20 categorizes each edge into a type list.
In Lines 21–27, the non-empty list with the highest priority
is assigned to L, which is then sorted according to a certain
feature F (e.g., degree centrality). Finally, L(1) represents the
index of an edge that is with the highest priority to be removed,
and meanwhile it has the highest value of feature F (e.g.,
highest degree).
B. Hierarchical Node Attack
Different from edges, nodes are hierarchically classified into
four types in descending order of priorities: 1) critical nodes;
2) subcritical nodes, whose removal does not increase the
number of needed driver nodes but increases the number of
unmatched nodes; 3) normal nodes, whose removal does not
affect the numbers of driver nodes and unmatched nodes; and
4) redundant nodes, whose removal enhances the controllabil-
ity contrarily. The subcritical, normal, and redundant nodes are
non-critical nodes. An example of these four types of nodes
is shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: [color online] Example of node hierarchy: (a) node 2 is
critical, whose removal increases the number of needed driver
nodes by 1; (b) node 6 is subcritical, whose removal does not
change the number of driver nodes, but increases the number
of unmatched nodes by 1; (c) node 7 is normal, whose removal
does not change the numbers of driver nodes and unmatched
nodes; (d) node 8 is redundant, whose removal decreases the
number of needed driver nodes by 1.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code for hierarchical node
selection. Given a network with N nodes, represented by its
adjacency matrix A, Algorithm 2 returns the index of the node
to be removed with the highest priority. Lines 1–4 initialize
four empty lists for the four types of nodes. Lines 5 and 6
calculate the numbers of needed driver nodes and unmatched
nodes of the original network before being attacked. The for-
loop between Lines 7–23 categorizes each node into a type list.
In Lines 24–32, the non-empty list with the highest priority
is assigned to L, which is then sorted according to certain
feature F . Finally, L(1) represents the index of a node that
has the highest priority to be removed, and meanwhile it has
the highest value of feature F .
Source codes of both hierarchical node and edge attack
algorithms are available for the public1.
1https://fylou.github.io/sourcecode.html
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Algorithm 1: Hierarchical Edge Selection
Input : adjacency matrix A; feature F ; number of
edges M
Output: index j of the edge to be attacked
1 L1 ← []; // highest priority
2 L2 ← [];
3 L3 ← []; // lowest priority
4 nA ← number of driver nodes needed for A;
5 uA ← number of unmatched nodes needed for A;
6 for i← 1 to M do
7 A0 ← A;
8 Delete edge i from A0;
9 nA0 ← number of driver nodes needed for A0;
10 uA0 ← number of unmatched nodes needed for A0;
11 if nA0 > nA then
12 L1.insert(i);
13 else
14 if uA0 > uA then
15 L2.insert(i);
16 else
17 L3.insert(i);
18 end
19 end
20 end
21 if L1 is not empty then
22 L← L1;
23 else if L1 is empty and L2 is not empty then
24 L← L2;
25 else
26 L← L3;
27 end
28 Sort L according to feature F , in descending order;
29 j ← L(1);
C. Extra Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of calculating the network
controllability, mainly in searching for the number of needed
driver nodes, is O(M ·√N), by the Hopcroft–Karp algorithm.
In a hierarchical node or edge attack, to identify whether a
node or edge is critical, the number of needed driver nodes to
be calculated iteratively introduces a non-negligible amount
of extra computational cost. This extra computational cost
for hierarchical edge attack is O(
∑M
i=1(i ·
√
N)), and for
hierarchical node attack is O(
∑N−1
i=1 (i ·
√
N)).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
In this section, the hierarchical attack framework is evalu-
ated by extensive simulations. Network features will be taken
into account. For node attacks, betweenness, out-degree and
closeness are used as feature F , respectively; for edge attacks,
betweenness and degree are used, respectively. To verify
the effectiveness of the proposed hierarchical framework, the
hierarchical feature-based attack strategies are compared to the
feature-based attack strategies, respectively. For example, the
hierarchical degree-based attack is compared to the degree-
based attack, under the same conditions.
Algorithm 2: Hierarchical Node Selection
Input : adjacency matrix A; feature F ; number of
nodes N
Output: index j of the node to be attacked
1 L1 ← []; // highest priority
2 L2 ← [];
3 L3 ← [];
4 L4 ← []; // lowest priority
5 nA ← number of driver nodes needed for A;
6 uA ← number of unmatched nodes needed for A;
7 for i← 1 to N do
8 A0 ← A;
9 Delete node i from A0;
10 nA0 ← number of driver nodes needed for A0;
11 uA0 ← number of unmatched nodes needed for A0;
12 if nA0 > nA then
13 L1.insert(i);
14 else if nA0 = nA then
15 if uA0 > uA then
16 L2.insert(i);
17 else
18 L3.insert(i);
19 end
20 else
21 L4.insert(i);
22 end
23 end
24 if L1 is not empty then
25 L← L1;
26 else if L1 is empty and L2 is not empty then
27 L← L2;
28 else if L1, L2 are empty and L3 is not empty then
29 L← L3;
30 else
31 L← L4;
32 end
33 Sort L according to feature F , in descending order;
34 j ← L(1);
Nine typical directed synthetic network models are adopted
for simulation, namely the Erdo¨s–Re´nyi random-graph (ER)
network [51], Newman–Watts small-world (SW) network [52],
generic scale-free (SF) network [37], [53], [54], q-snapback
(QS) network [55], q-snapback network with redirected edges
(QR) [56], random triangle (RT) network [24], and random
rectangle (RR) network [24], extremely homogeneous (HO)
network [57], and onion-like (OL) network [58].
Recall that the HO networks were empirically verified with
optimal controllability robustness before [57]. Given an N -
node and M -edge configuration, the HO network satisfies
bM/Nc ≤ kin,outi ≤ dM/Ne, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . This means
that both of its in- and out-degrees are distributed identically
or nearly identically with a small difference less than 1. The
OL network is generated from an SF network via simple
edge-swapping with degree reservation [58], thus its degree
distribution follows the same power-law distribution as the SF.
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The detailed generation methods and parameter settings
of these synthetic networks are provided in Supplementary
Information (SI)2. The network size is set to N = 500, 1000,
and 1500, respectively. The average degree is set to 〈k〉 = 3,
5, and 10, respectively.
In addition, nine real-world networks are used for sim-
ulations, with data taken from Network Repository3. Their
parameters and brief descriptions are presented in Table I.
TABLE I: Basic information of the real-world networks.
Network File name Brief description N M
BMK bn-mouse-kasthuri-graph-v4 brain network 1029 1559
ICM ia-crime-moreno interaction network 830 1474
IEU inf-euroroad infrastructure network 1175 1417
DEL delaunay-n10 DIMACS10 problem 1024 3056
DW5 dwt-1005 symmetric connection
from Washington
1005 3808
DW7 dwt-1007 1007 3784
LSH lshp1009 Alan GeorgesL-shape problem 1009 2928
OLM olm1000 computational fluiddynamics problem 1000 2996
RAJ rajat19 Rajat19 circuitsimulation matrix 1157 4433
A. Comparison of Attack Strategies
1) Node-removal attacks: Nine node-removal attack strate-
gies are compared, namely the betweenness-based (B), out-
degree-based (D), closeness-based (C), random (R), hierar-
chical betweenness-based (HB), hierarchical out-degree-based
(HD), hierarchical closeness-based (HC), hierarchical random
(HR), and hybrid (Hy) attacks.
The B, D, C strategies aim at removing the node with
the largest betweenness, degree, and closeness, respectively,
at every step. The HB, HD, HC strategies aim at removing
critical nodes that are sorted in a betweenness-, degree-, and
closeness-descending order, respectively, at every step. The
HR removes the critical nodes at random.
The Hy strategy is designed as follows: First, remove either
the node (or edge) with the maximum degree (or betweenness),
according to the removal of which node (or edge) will cause
greater destruction to the network controllability. If equal, then
choose either one to attack.
2) Edge-removal attacks: Eight edge attack strategies are
compared, namely the betweenness-based (B), out-degree-
based (D), random (R), hierarchical betweenness-based (HB),
hierarchical out-degree-based (HD), hierarchical random (HR),
initial critical (IC) [42] and hybrid (Hy) attacks.
Here, the ‘out-in’ edge degree is used, which is defined as
the sum of the out-degree of its source node and the in-degree
of its target node [42].
For each node and each edge attack, the simulation repeats
30 and 20 independent runs, respectively.
B. Simulation Results on Synthetic Networks
Here, the structural controllability (see Eq. (2)) is consid-
ered for controllability robustness comparison. The simulation
2https://fylou.github.io/pdf/hatk_si.pdf
3http://networkrepository.com/
results of some synthetic networks with N = 1000 and real-
world networks are presented. More detailed and complete
results for networks with N = 500, 1000 and 1500 are given
in the SI.
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Fig. 5: [color online] Results of edge attacks on ER, HO, and
OL (N = 1000): hierarchical betweenness-based (E-HB) and
betweenness-based (E-B) strategies.
Fig. 5 shows the results of ER, HO, and OL under E-HB
and E-B attacks. It is clear that E-HB is consistently more
destructive than E-B throughout the entire process as shown
in Figs. 5 (a,b,d,e,f,g,h,i); while Fig. 5 (c) shows that E-HB is
more destructive than E-B when PE < 0.7, but E-B is slightly
more destructive when PE > 0.7.
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Fig. 6: [color online] Results of edge attacks on ER, HO,
and OL (N = 1000): hierarchical degree-based (E-HD) and
degree-based (E-D) strategies.
Fig. 6 shows that E-HD is consistently more destructive
than E-D. Fig. 7 shows that E-HR is consistently more
destructive than E-R and E-IC. Figs 5–7 show that HO has
better controllability robustness than ER; both HO and ER
have significantly better controllability robustness than OL.
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Fig. 7: [color online] Results of edge attacks on ER, HO, and
OL (N = 1000): random (E-R), hierarchical random (E-HR)
and initial critical (IC) strategies.
As the average degree increases, the controllability robustness
improves.
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Fig. 8: [color online] Results of edge attacks on ER, HO, and
OL (N = 1000): three hierarchical attacks (E-HB, E-HD and
E-HR) and hybrid (E-Hy) strategies.
Fig. 8 compares the three hierarchical attacks (E-HB, E-HD
and E-HR) and hybrid attack (E-Hy). For ER and HO, it is
clear that E-HB is more destructive than the other strategies;
while for OL, either E-HR or E-HB is most destructive.
Figs. 5–8 show that the hierarchical framework increases the
destruction effects on the network controllability. It can also
be seen that, among the hierarchical attack strategies, E-HB
performs the best.
The overall comparison is summarized in Table II, where
each value is the ratio of the overall destruction (see Eq. (6)
for node attacks and Eq. (7) for edge attacks) under the two
corresponding attack strategies. For example, the value 1.210
in row ‘〈k〉 = 3, ER’ and column ‘Node Attack, HB/B’
represents that, given an ER (〈k〉 = 3) under node attacks,
the overall destruction ratio of N-HB versus N-B is 1.210.
Referring to Fig. 5 (a), the value is equivalent to the ratio of
the area under the blue dashed-line versus the area under the
red dotted-line.
If HB/B > 1, it means that HB is more destructive; if HB/B
< 1, it means that B is more destructive; otherwise, if HB/H
= 1, it means that HB and B are equivalently destructive.
Here, an equivalent overall destruction does not mean that the
two controllability curves are overlapped, but means that the
areas under the two controllability curves are equal, namely
they are equivalent in the average sense.
As can be seen from the ‘Node Attacks’ part in Table II, the
hierarchical attack strategies are consistently more destructive
than the non-hierarchical and the hybrid strategies, for the ratio
values are greater than 1 in the columns of HB/B, HD/D,
HC/C, and HR/R.
In the columns of HB/Hy and HD/Hy, hierarchical strategies
generally outperform the hybrid strategy. It should be noted
that, when the ratio is within [0.990, 1.010], one may consider
the two comparing strategies to have equivalent performances.
As for the edge-removal attacks, the hierarchical strategies
are more destructive than the non-hierarchical ones and the
IC (which does not update the critical edge list). However,
the ratio values in the column of HD/Hy are mostly less than
1, meaning that HD is less destructive than Hy. This implies
that edge degree is not a good measure of importance regard-
ing destructive attacks. Nevertheless, within the hierarchical
framework, E-HD is more destructive than E-D.
The results for cases of N = 500 and N = 1500 are tabled
in SI.
The attack simulation results on real-world networks are
shown in Table III, while the detailed comparison figures for
different networks are included in SI.
The attack simulations on various synthetic networks and
real-world networks show that the hierarchical strategies are
consistently more destructive to network controllability than
other attack strategies.
C. Critical Edges and Nodes
A common phenomenon is observed from the results pre-
sented in Sec. IV-B: as the average degree increases, the ratio
of areas under the controllability curves subject to hierarchical
and non-hierarchical attacks tends asymptotically to 1. This is
because, as the network becomes denser, hence more homo-
geneous, fewer critical edges and nodes are exposed. It not
only improves the controllability robustness of the network,
but also makes the proposed hierarchical attack strategies less
effective, thereby becoming similar to non-hierarchical attacks.
Table IV shows the minimum (integer) average degree when
there is no critical nodes or edges found in the initial network.
Here, initial means the network that has not been attacked. For
each topology with a given 〈k〉 value, 30 network instances
are simulated. Given N = 500, 〈k〉 is set from 3 with an
incremental value 1. If there are no critical nodes or edges
found in all the 30 instances, then the 〈k〉 value is recorded into
Table IV; otherwise, 〈k〉 increases by 1 and then the process
is run again. It can be seen from the table that, for SW and
HO, there are no critical nodes or edges found when 〈k〉 = 3,
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TABLE II: Comparison of attack strategies on the nine synthetic networks (N = 1000), where B represents betweenness; D
represents degree; C represents closeness; R represents random; Hy represents hybrid; IC represents initial critical edges; HB
represents hierarchical betweenness; HD represents hierarchical degree; HC represents hierarchical closeness; HR represents
hierarchical random attacks.
N=1000 Node Attack Edge AttackHB/B HD/D HC/C HR/R HB/Hy HD/Hy HB/B HD/D HR/R HB/Hy HD/Hy HR/IC
〈k〉=3
ER 1.210 1.151 1.313 1.469 1.111 1.132 1.112 1.585 1.454 1.123 0.848 1.225
SW 1.286 1.070 1.209 1.275 1.065 1.081 1.157 1.339 1.426 1.295 0.997 1.426
SF 1.033 1.011 1.029 1.266 1.007 1.009 1.158 1.246 1.157 1.157 1.101 1.060
QS 1.303 1.198 1.661 1.344 1.098 1.185 1.123 2.256 1.463 1.123 0.886 1.241
QR 1.336 1.160 1.330 1.445 1.138 1.155 1.118 1.721 1.440 1.122 0.874 1.411
RT 1.148 1.095 1.164 1.590 1.056 1.070 1.260 1.679 1.393 1.280 1.072 1.202
RR 1.245 1.110 1.240 1.527 1.095 1.098 1.217 1.682 1.438 1.231 1.013 1.282
HO 1.247 1.170 1.436 1.416 1.141 1.148 1.151 1.336 1.378 1.095 1.143 1.382
OL 1.034 1.012 1.028 1.273 1.007 1.007 1.161 1.241 1.161 1.164 1.104 1.060
〈k〉=5
ER 1.207 1.209 1.339 1.483 1.149 1.165 1.051 1.377 1.354 1.052 0.627 1.272
SW 1.296 1.171 1.337 1.383 1.135 1.150 1.067 1.421 1.261 1.142 0.756 1.292
SF 1.051 1.017 1.048 1.371 1.015 1.015 1.179 1.348 1.208 1.191 1.101 1.084
QS 1.235 1.268 1.984 1.348 1.167 1.214 1.066 2.097 1.476 1.054 0.732 1.477
QR 1.273 1.197 1.345 1.502 1.152 1.156 1.078 1.416 1.366 1.077 0.673 1.370
RT 1.201 1.152 1.222 1.630 1.110 1.118 1.106 1.543 1.378 1.176 0.751 1.339
RR 1.239 1.154 1.264 1.545 1.109 1.120 1.111 1.435 1.305 1.132 0.756 1.326
HO 1.234 1.176 1.399 1.431 1.150 1.136 1.074 1.413 1.258 1.026 0.994 1.246
OL 1.048 1.019 1.046 1.367 1.010 1.010 1.205 1.340 1.199 1.199 1.098 1.077
〈k〉=10
ER 1.214 1.208 1.320 1.450 1.148 1.117 1.025 1.325 1.202 1.030 0.470 1.221
SW 1.217 1.208 1.363 1.376 1.149 1.113 1.064 1.238 1.127 1.102 0.479 1.164
SF 1.078 1.036 1.080 1.590 1.025 1.027 1.205 1.608 1.336 1.197 0.916 1.155
QS 1.167 1.315 2.875 1.295 1.198 1.195 1.036 1.777 1.395 1.188 0.576 1.369
QR 1.228 1.203 1.359 1.427 1.148 1.116 1.029 1.341 1.154 1.044 0.487 1.137
RT 1.211 1.208 1.286 1.496 1.121 1.128 1.075 1.332 1.280 1.057 0.515 1.221
RR 1.224 1.169 1.300 1.409 1.106 1.119 1.090 1.309 1.214 1.083 0.555 1.187
HO 1.201 1.194 1.361 1.376 1.157 1.140 1.034 1.275 1.063 1.078 0.697 1.063
OL 1.066 1.034 1.079 1.577 1.021 1.022 1.189 1.619 1.369 1.212 0.932 1.167
TABLE III: Comparison of attack strategies on the nine real-world networks, where B represents betweenness; D represents
degree; C represents closeness; R represents random; Hy represents hybrid; IC represents initial critical edges; HB represents
hierarchical betweenness; HD represents hierarchical degree; HC represents hierarchical closeness; HR represents hierarchical
random attacks.
Node Attack Edge Attack
HB/B HD/D HC/C HR/R HB/Hy HD/Hy HB/B HD/D HR/R HB/Hy HD/Hy HR/IC
BMK 1.066 1.007 1.010 1.157 1.004 1.005 1.031 1.063 1.056 1.030 0.988 1.027
ICM 1.044 1.102 1.183 1.361 1.033 1.041 1.101 1.201 1.187 1.100 1.004 1.088
IEU 1.187 1.050 1.137 1.361 1.007 1.040 1.109 1.377 1.291 1.115 1.097 1.096
DEL 1.203 1.174 1.191 1.311 1.064 1.057 1.108 1.416 1.248 1.112 0.889 1.163
DW5 1.276 1.149 1.456 1.423 1.097 0.995 1.167 1.483 1.381 1.169 0.838 1.237
DW7 1.323 1.036 1.597 1.314 1.004 0.994 1.205 2.224 1.284 1.235 1.291 1.269
LSH 1.301 1.312 1.977 1.264 1.066 1.086 1.121 1.585 1.301 1.122 0.907 1.217
OLM 1.007 1.001 1.009 1.946 1.010 1.019 1.281 1.660 1.611 1.696 1.627 1.649
RAJ 1.297 1.076 1.252 1.769 1.064 1.082 1.508 1.749 1.502 1.805 1.403 1.292
TABLE IV: The lowest average out-degree when there is no
critical nodes or edges found in the network.
ER SW SF QS QR RT RR HO OL
Node 9 3 23 6 4 8 6 3 22
Edge 10 3 24 5 6 8 6 3 22
meaning that removal of any node or edge in the initial SW
or HO will not increase the number of needed driver nodes.
Thus, their controllability robustness is better than the others.
In contrast, for SF and OL, before 〈k〉 increases to 22 and 24,
respectively, there were no critical nodes or edges. It means
that in dense SF or OL networks (e.g., 〈k〉 = 20), there are
still critical nodes and edges, and removing any critical node
or edge will directly destroy its controllability. Thus, SF and
OL have much worse initial controllability and controllability
robustness than the other networks.
Fig. 9 shows the number of critical edges in the initial SF
and OL networks, against the increase of average degree. The
corresponding figure for the case with critical nodes is shown
in SI. The initial controllability is plotted for reference in each
subplot. As shown in Fig. 9, the numbers of critical edges in
the initial SF and OL networks increase as 〈k〉 increases from
3 to 13; when 〈k〉 > 16, the numbers of critical edges drop
drastically. Meanwhile, the initial controllability of both SF
and OL becomes better as the average degree increases. When
3 ≤ 〈k〉 ≤ 13, the additional edges enhance the connectedness
and make the networks more controllable. These additional
edges become part of the critical edges. However, when 〈k〉 >
16, the initial controllability of the SF networks tends to be
sufficiently optimized, reflected by the lower density of needed
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Fig. 9: Number of critical edges (boxplots) and initial con-
trollability (stars *) against the average degree of (a) SF and
(b) OL networks.
driver nodes. In this case, the increased edges cover the critical
nodes and edges, which leads to the drastically drops of the
numbers of (the exposed) critical edges.
The exposure of critical nodes and edges sets a clear target
for the attacker to destroy the network controllability. In
contrast, in the networks with strong controllability robustness,
there are rare (or no) critical nodes and edges exposed; for
example, SW, HO, QS and QR. For these networks, the
attacker is unable or uneasy to find targets to attack in order to
destruct the controllability. This finding is consistent with, and
actually extends the applicability of, the previous findings: 1)
dense and homogeneous networks have better controllability
[5]; 2) extremely-homogeneous topology has the optimal con-
trollability robustness [57]. Nevertheless, critical nodes and
edges will expose themselves during the attack process, as
the network becomes sparser. To design networks with good
controllability robustness, the exposure of critical nodes and
edges should be dimmed or avoided, if ever possible. If there
are sufficient numbers of available edges, the networks should
be designed as dense and homogeneous as possible [5], [57];
otherwise, if the numbers of edges are limited, they should
be deliberately assigned in such a way that the exposure of
critical nodes and edges is minimum.
Fig. 10 shows the types of removed nodes and edges during
an attack. As can be seen from Fig. 10 (a), HO and SW
do not expose critical nodes in the early stage, and thus the
attacker could only remove the normal or subcritical nodes;
later, in the middle stage, both HO and SW expose some
critical nodes; finally, SW has only redundant nodes left. The
other 7 networks expose more critical nodes than HO or SW
during the attack process. Note that, although for OL and
SF, there are more normal nodes than critical ones during the
attack process, their initial controllability is no good (see the
controllability curves in SI).
V. CONCLUSIONS
To better understand the network controllability robustness
from the perspective of destructive attacks, a hierarchical at-
tack framework is proposed, which can be used for both edge-
and node-removal attacks. The hierarchical attack strategies
aim at removing the critical nodes and edges with the highest
priority, and they can be combined together with other com-
monly used features (e.g., degree or edge centrality), such that
the identified critical nodes or edges can be sorted in descend-
ing order according to such features. Extensive experiments
on nine synthetic networks with various topologies and nine
real-world networks show the effectiveness of the proposed hi-
erarchical attack framework on destructive attacks to network
controllability for all kinds of networks that are tested. For
node attacks, betweenness, out-degree, and closeness are used
as the feature, respectively; for edge attacks, betweenness and
degree are used, respectively. The hierarchical feature-related
attacks show consistently better destructive performances than
the common feature-only attacks.
It is revealed that the exposure of the critical edges and
nodes are disadvantageous in resisting attacks to the network
controllability. Therefore, to design networks with strong
controllability robustness, the critical nodes and edges should
be deliberately hidden. This finding is consistent with, and also
extends the applicability of, the previous findings: 1) dense
and homogeneous networks have better controllability [5]; 2)
extremely-homogeneous topology has the optimal controlla-
bility robustness with fixed numbers of nodes and edges [57].
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